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ABSTRACT
Nonmonotonic logics are usually characterized by the pres-
ence of some notion of ‘conditional’ that fails monotonicity.
Research on nonmonotonic logics is therefore largely con-
cerned with the defeasibility of argument forms and the as-
sociated normality (or abnormality) of its constituents. In
contrast, defeasible modes of inference aim to formalize the
defeasible aspects of modal notions such as actions, obli-
gations and knowledge. In this work we enrich the stan-
dard possible worlds semantics with a preference ordering
on worlds in Kripke models. The resulting family of modal
logics allow for the elegant expression of defeasible modali-
ties. We also propose a tableau calculus which is sound and
complete with respect to our preferential semantics.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Defeasible reasoning, as traditionally studied in the litera-
ture on nonmonotonic reasoning, has focused mostly on one
aspect of defeasibility, namely that of argument forms. Such
is the case in the approach by Kraus et al. [33, 35], known
as the KLM approach, and related frameworks [5, 6, 7, 8,
10, 15, 20, 21]. For instance, in the KLM approach (propo-
sitional) defeasible consequence relations |∼ with a preferen-
tial semantics are studied. In this setting, the meaning of
a defeasible statement (or a ‘conditional’, as it is sometimes
referred to) of the form α |∼ β is that “all normal α-worlds
are β-worlds”, leaving it open for α-worlds that are, in a
sense, exceptional not to satisfy β. With the theory that
has been developed around this notion it becomes possible
to cope with exceptionality when performing reasoning.
There are of course many other appealing and equally use-
ful aspects of defeasibility besides that of arguments. These
include notions such as typicality [4, 21], concerned with
the most typical cases or situations (or even the most typ-
ical representatives of a class), and belief plausibility [2],
which relates to the most plausible epistemic possibilities
held by an agent, amongst others. It turns out that with
KLM-style defeasible statements one cannot capture these
aspects of defeasibility. This has to do partly with the syn-
tactic restrictions imposed on |∼, namely no nesting of con-
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ditionals, but, more fundamentally, it relates to where and
how the notion of normality is used in such statements. In-
deed, in a KLM defeasible statement α |∼ β, the normality
spotlight is somewhat put on α, as though normality was a
property of the premise and not of the conclusion. Whether
the situations in which β holds are normal or not plays no
role in the reasoning that is carried out. In the original
KLM framework, normality is also linked to the premise as a
whole, rather than its constituents. Technically this meant
one could not refer directly to normality of a sentence in
the scope of logical operators. This limitation is overcome
by taking a (modal) conditional approach a` la Boutilier [5]
— the resulting conditional logics are sufficiently general to
allow for the expression of a number of different forms of
defeasible reasoning. However, the emphasis remains on the
defeasibility of arguments, or of conditionals.
In this paper we investigate a related, but incompara-
ble, notion which we refer to as defeasible modes of infer-
ence [11].1 These amount to defeasible versions of the tradi-
tional notions of actions, obligations, knowledge and beliefs,
to name a few, as studied in modal logics. For instance, in
an action context, one can say that normally the outcome of
a given action a is α . However we may also want to state
that the outcome of a is usually (or normally) α, which is
different from the former statement. To see why, the first
statement says that in the most normal worlds, the result of
performing the action a is always α, whereas in the second
one it is in the most normal situations resulting from a’s ex-
ecution that α holds — regardless of whether the situation
in which the claim is uttered is normal or not.
For a concrete example, assume one arrives at a dark room
and wants to toggle the light switch. Exceptionally, the light
will not turn on. This can be either because the light bulb
is blown (the current situation is abnormal) or because an
overcharge was caused while switching the light (the action
behaves abnormally). In the former case, the normality of
the situation, or state, before the action is assessed, whereas
in the latter the relative normality of the situation is assessed
against all possible outcomes. Here we are interested in
the formalization of the latter type of statement, where it
becomes important to shift the notion of normality from
the premise of an inference to the effect of an action, and,
importantly, use it in the scope of other logical constructors.
Our next example concerns obligations and weaker ver-
sions thereof. There is a subtle difference between stating
1The present paper extends and refines the preliminary pro-
posal which was presented at the 14th International Work-
shop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR).
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that, from the perspective of any normal situation, rhino
poaching ought to carry a minimum prison sentence of 10
years, and stating that, from any perspective, the minimum
sentence for rhino poaching normally ought to be 10 years.
The shift in focus is again from normality of the present
world, to relative normality amongst possible worlds. In the
former statement, an abnormal present world would render
the obligation unenforceable, whereas in the latter state-
ment, the obligation is applicable in all relatively normal
accessible worlds. We contend that the informal notion of
‘normal, reasonable obligations’ is more accurately modeled
as defeasible modalities than as conditional statements.
Scenarios such as the ones depicted above require an abil-
ity to talk about the normality of effects of an action, relative
normality of obligations, and so on. While existing modal
treatments of preferential reasoning can express preferential
semantics syntactically as modalities [5, 6, 20], they do not
suffice to express defeasible modes of inference as described
above. The ability to capture precisely these forms of de-
feasibility remains a fundamental challenge in the definition
of a coherent theory of defeasible reasoning. At present we
can formalize only the first type of statements above by, e.g.
stating  |∼ α in Britz et al.’s extension of preferential
reasoning to modal languages [8, 10]. (As we shall see later
in the paper, both Boutilier’s [5] and Booth et al.’s [4] ap-
proaches also have to be enriched in order to capture the
forms of defeasibility we are interested in here.)
In this paper we make the first steps towards filling this
gap by introducing (non-standard) modal operators allow-
ing us to talk about relative normality in accessible worlds.
With our defeasible versions of modalities, we can make
statements of the form“α holds in all of the relatively normal
accessible worlds”, thereby capturing defeasibility of what is
‘expected’ in target worlds. This notion of defeasibility in a
modality meets a variety of applications in Artificial Intelli-
gence, ranging from reasoning about actions to deontic and
epistemic reasoning. For instance, a defeasible-action opera-
tor allows us to make statements of the form ∼∼aα, which we
read as “α is a normal necessary effect of a” (i.e., necessary
in the most normal of a’s outcomes), and with defeasible-
obligation operators one can state formulae such as ∼∼Aα,
read as “α is a normal obligation of agent A”.
These operators are defined within the context of a general
preferential modal semantics obtained by enriching the stan-
dard possible worlds semantics with a preference order. The
main difference between the approach we propose here and
that of Boutilier [5] is in whether the underlying preference
ordering alters the meaning of modalities or not. Boutilier’s
conditional is defined directly from a preference order in a
bi-modal language, but the meanings of any additional, in-
dependently axiomatized, modalities are not influenced by
the preference order. Our defeasible modalities correspond
to a modification of the other modalities using the prefer-
ence relation. Also, in contrast with the plausibility models
of Baltag and Smets [2], the preference order we consider
here does not define an agent’s knowledge or beliefs. Rather,
it is part of the semantics of the background ontology de-
scribed by the theory or knowledge base at hand. As such, it
informs the meaning of defeasible actions, which can fail in
their outcome, or defeasible obligations, which may not hold
in exceptional accessible worlds, in that it alters the classical
semantics of these modalities. This allows for the definition
of a family of modal logics in which defeasible modes of in-
ference can be expressed, and which can be integrated with
existing |∼-based nonmonotonic modal logics [8, 10].
The remainder of the present paper is structured as fol-
lows: After setting up the notation and terminology that we
shall follow in this paper (Section 2), we revisit Britz et al.’s
preferential semantics for modal logic [8, 10] (Section 3)
by proposing a simplified version thereof. In Section 4 we
present a logic enriched with defeasible modalities allow-
ing for the formalization of defeasible versions of modes of
inference. In Section 5 we present a detailed example il-
lustrating the application of our constructions in an action
context. Following that, we define a tableau system for the
corresponding logic that we show to be sound and complete
with respect to our preferential semantics (Section 6). In
Section 7 we assess |∼-statements in our richer language.
After a discussion of and comparison with related work (Sec-
tion 8), we conclude with some comments and directions for
further investigation. All the proofs of our results can be
found in the Appendix.
2. MODAL LOGIC
We assume the reader is familiar with modal logic [14].
The purpose of this section is to make explicit the terminol-
ogy and notation we shall use.
Here we work within a set of atomic propositions P, using
the logical connectives ∧ (conjunction), ¬ (negation), and a
set of modal operators i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (In later sections we
shall adopt a richer language.) We assume that the under-
lying multimodal logic is independently axiomatized (i.e.,
the logic is a fusion and there is no interaction between the
modal operators [32]). Propositions are denoted by p, q, . . .,
and formulae by α, β, . . ., constructed in the usual way ac-
cording to the rule: α ::= p | ¬α | α∧α | iα. All the other
truth functional connectives (∨, →, ↔, . . . ) are defined in
terms of ¬ and ∧ in the usual way. Given i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
with i we denote its dual modal operator, i.e., for any α,
iα ≡def ¬i¬α. We use  as an abbreviation for p ∨ ¬p,
and ⊥ as an abbreviation for p ∧ ¬p, for some p ∈ P.
With L we denote the set of all formulae of the modal lan-
guage. The semantics is the standard possible-worlds one:
Definition 1. A Kripke model is a tuple M = 〈W,R,V〉
where W is a (non-empty) set of possible worlds, R = 〈R1,
. . . ,Rn〉, where each Ri ⊆ W×W is an accessibility relation
on W, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and V : W × P −→ {0, 1} is a valuation
function.
Satisfaction of formulae with respect to possible worlds in
a Kripke model is defined in the usual way:
Definition 2. Let M = 〈W,R,V〉 and w ∈ W:
• M , w  p if and only if V(w, p) = 1;
• M , w  ¬α if and only if M , w  α;
• M , w  α ∧ β if and only if M , w  α and M , w  β;
• M , w  iα if and only if M , w′  α for all w′ such
that (w,w′) ∈ Ri.
Given α ∈ L andM = 〈W,R,V〉, we say thatM satisfies α
if there is at least one world w ∈ W such thatM , w  α. We
say that M is a model of α (alias α is true in M ), denoted
M  α, if M , w  α for every world w ∈ W. Given a class
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of models M, we say that α is valid in M if every Kripke
model M ∈ M is a model of α.
Here we shall assume the system of normal modal logic K,
of which all the other normal modal logics are extensions.
Semantically, K is characterized by the class of all Kripke
models (Definition 1). We say that α locally entails β in
the system K (denoted α |= β) if for every K-model M and
every w in M , M , w  α implies M , w  β.
Syntactically, K corresponds to the smallest set of sen-
tences containing all propositional tautologies, all instances
of the axiom schema K : i(α → β) → (iα → iβ),
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and closed under the rule of necessitation RN :
α/iα, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
3. MODAL PREFERENTIAL SEMANTICS
In this section we modify the constructions for preferential
reasoning in modal logic as studied by Britz et al. [8, 10]. We
do so by enriching standard Kripke models with preference
relations, instead of placing an ordering on states which are
labeled with pointed Kripke models. Our starting point is
therefore similar to the CT4O models of Boutilier [5] and
the plausibility models of Baltag and Smets [2].
Definition 3. A preferential Kripke model is a tupleP :=
〈W,R,V,≺〉 where W is a (non-empty) set of possible worlds,
R = 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉, where each Ri ⊆ W × W is an accessi-
bility relation on W, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, V : W × P −→ {0, 1} is
a valuation function, and ≺ ⊆ W × W is a co-Noetherian
strict partial order on W, i.e., ≺ is irreflexive, transitive and
well-founded.2
Given a preferential Kripke model P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉, we
refer to M := 〈W,R,V〉 as its associated standard Kripke
model. If P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉 is a preferential Kripke model
and α ∈ L, then with α := {w ∈ W | M , w  α, where
M = 〈W,R,V〉} we denote the set of possible worlds satis-
fying α (α-worlds for short).
Definition 4. Let P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉 and let W′ ⊆ W.
With min≺ W′ we denote the minimal elements of W′ with
respect to ≺, i.e., min≺ W′ := {w ∈ W′ | there is no w′ ∈ W′
such that w′ ≺ w}.
The intuition behind the preference relation ≺ in a pref-
erential Kripke model P is that worlds lower down in the
order are more preferred (or more normal [4, 5]) than those
higher up. Note that the preference relation in a preferential
Kripke model, although a binary relation on W, is not to be
seen as an accessibility relation. Indeed, the ≺-component
in a preferential Kripke model has no counterpart in the
syntax as each accessibility relation has.
As an example, Figure 1 below depicts the preferential
Kripke model P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉, where W = {wi | 1 ≤
i ≤ 5}, R = 〈R〉, with R = {(w1, w2), (w1, w4), (w2, w3),
(w2, w5), (w3, w2), (w4, w5), (w5, w4)}, represented by the
solid arrows in the picture, V is the obvious valuation func-
tion (in our pictorial representations of models we interpret
2This implies the smoothness condition in Kraus et al.’s
terminology [33], which basically says that ≺ has no in-
finitely descending chains. Even though well-foundedness
is stronger than smoothness, here we prefer to stick to the
term that is more broadly known outside the nonmonotonic
reasoning circle.
absence of an atom as the atom being false in the respec-
tive world), and ≺ is the transitive closure of {(w1, w2),
(w1, w3), (w2, w4), (w3, w4), (w4, w5)}, represented by the
dashed arrows in the picture. (Note the direction of the
dashed arrows, which point from less preferred to more pre-
ferred worlds.)
P :
• w1 {p}
•{p, q} w2 • w3 {p, q}
• w4 {q}
• w5 {}
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Figure 1: A preferential Kripke model for P = {p, q}
and a single modality.
Given P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉 and α ∈ L, α is satisfiable in P
if α = ∅, otherwise α is unsatisfiable in P. We say that α
is true in P (denoted P  α) if α = W. It is easy to see
that the addition of the ≺-component preserves the truth of
all (classical) modal formulae that are true in the remaining
Kripke structure:
Lemma 1. Let α ∈ L (i.e., α is a classical modal for-
mula). Let P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉 be a preferential Kripke model
and M = 〈W,R,V〉 its associated standard Kripke model.
Then P  α if and only if M  α.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We can define classes of preferential Kripke models in the
same way we do in the classical case. For instance, we can
talk about the class of reflexive preferential Kripke models,
in which the R-components are reflexive. We say that α is
valid in the class M of preferential Kripke models if and
only if α is true in every P ∈ M. Therefore, the following
result is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1:
Corollary 1. A modal formula α is valid in the class M
of preferential Kripke models if and only if it is valid in the
corresponding class of Kripke models.
4. PREFERENCE-BASED MODALITIES
Recalling our discussion in the Introduction, we want to
be able to state that a given sentence holds in all the rela-
tively normal worlds that are accessible. This leads us to the
definition of a ‘weaker’ version of the  modalities. Through
them we are then able to single out those normal situations
that one cannot grasp via the classical  modalities. Simi-
larly, we want to be able to state that a given sentence holds
in at least one relatively normal accessible world. This leads
us to the definition of a stronger version of , which may be
read as distinct possibility.
We define a more expressive language than L by extend-
ing our modal language with a family of defeasible modal
operators ∼∼i and ∼∼ i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (called, respectively, the
‘flag’ and the ‘flame’), where n is the number of classical
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modalities in the language. The formulae of the extended
language are then recursively defined by:
α ::= p | ¬α | α ∧ α | iα | ∼∼iα | ∼∼ iα
(As before, the other connectives are defined in terms of ¬
and ∧ in the usual way, and  and ⊥ are seen as abbrevia-
tions. It turns out that each ∼∼ i too is the dual of ∼∼i, as we
shall see below.) With L˜ we denote the set of all formulae
of such a richer language.
The semantics of L˜ is in terms of our preferential Kripke
models (see Definition 3). As before, given α ∈ L˜ and a
preferential Kripke model P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉, with α we
denote the set of elements of W satisfying α.
Definition 5. Let P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉 be a preferential
Kripke model. Then:
• ∼∼iα := {w ∈ W | min≺ Ri(w) ⊆ α};
•  ∼∼ iα := {w ∈ W | min≺ Ri(w) ∩ α = ∅}.
The intuition behind a sentence like ∼∼iα is that α holds
in the most ‘normal’ of Ri-accessible worlds. ∼∼ iα intuitively
says that α holds in at least one such relatively normal ac-
cessible world. To give a simple example (a more elaborated
one is given in Section 5), if toggle denotes the action of tog-
gling the light switch and light the proposition “the light is
on”, with the formula ¬light → ∼∼togglelight we formalize the
example from the Introduction.
As mentioned before, in our enriched language the pref-
erence relation is not explicit in the syntax. The meaning
of the new modalities is informed by the preference relation,
which nevertheless remains tacit outside the realm of defea-
sible modalities. This stands in contrast to the approaches
of Baltag and Smets [2], Boutilier [5], Britz et al. [6] and
Giordano et al. [20], which cast the preference relation as
an extra modality in the language. From a knowledge rep-
resentation perspective, our approach has the advantage of
hiding some complex aspects of the semantics from the user
(e.g. a knowledge engineer who will write down sentences in
an agent’s knowledge base).
The notions of satisfaction in a preferential Kripke model,
truth (in a model) and validity (in a class of preferential
Kripke models) are extended to formulae with defeasible
modalities in the obvious way.
We observe that, like in the classical (i.e., non-defeasible)
case, the defeasible modal operators ∼∼ and ∼∼ are the dual
of each other:
|= ∼∼iα ↔ ¬ ∼∼ i¬α (1)
The following validities are also easy to verify:
|= ∼∼i⊥ ↔ i⊥ |= i ↔ ∼∼ i
|= ∼∼i ↔  |= ∼∼ i⊥ ↔ ⊥
The following is the ∼∼-version of Axiom Schema K.
(K˜) |= ∼∼i(α → β) → (∼∼iα → ∼∼iβ) (2)
The validity below is easy to verify:
(R˜) |= ∼∼i(α ∧ β) ↔ (∼∼iα ∧ ∼∼iβ) (3)
We also have |= (∼∼iα ∨ ∼∼iβ) → ∼∼i(α ∨ β), but not the
converse, as can easily be checked.
The following validity is an immediate consequence of our
preferential semantics:
(N) |= iα → ∼∼iα (4)
Intuitively, given i = 1, . . . , n, where n is the number of
modalities in the language, we want i and ∼∼i to be ‘tied’
together in so far as one is the defeasible (or the ‘hard’)
version of the other. Schema N is in line with the commonly
accepted principle that whatever is classically the case is
also defeasibly so.3
From duality of ∼∼ and ∼∼ and contraposition of N we get:
|= ∼∼ iα → iα (5)
It can easily be checked that in our preferential semantics,
the standard rule of necessitation RN : α/iα holds. The
following rule of normal necessitation (RNN) follows from
RN together with Schema N in (4) above:
(RNN)
α
∼∼iα
(6)
From satisfaction of (1), (2) and (3), one can see that
the logic of our defeasible modalities shares properties com-
monly characterizing the so-called normal modal logics [14].
In particular, we have that the following rule holds:
(NRK)
(α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αn) → β
(∼∼iα1 ∧ . . . ∧ ∼∼iαn) → ∼∼iβ
(n ≥ 0) (7)
The observant reader would have noticed that we assume
we have as many defeasible modalities as we have classical
ones. That is, for each i, a corresponding ∼∼i (its defeasible
version) is assumed. Moreover they are both linked together
via Schema N in (4). In principle, from a technical point of
view, nothing precludes us from having defeasible modali-
ties with no corresponding classical version or the other way
round. The latter is easily dealt with by simply not having
∼∼i for some i for which i is present in the language. The
former case, on the other hand, would require an elaboration
of the semantics as satisfiability of ∼∼-formulae calls upon the
accessibility relation Ri, associated with the i-modality.
The dependency between each (classical) modality and its
defeasible counterpart is defined by a (fixed) preference order
on worlds in the model. We do not have a Hilbert-style ax-
iomatization of this dependency yet. What is certain is that
such an axiomatization would require casting the preference
order as a modality, in order to axiomatize the relationship
between ∼∼i, ∼∼ i and the preference order ≺, for each i. To
this end, we may use, for example, the modal axiomatization
of the preference order of Britz et al. [6], or one of Boutilier’s
modal systems [5]. Such an axiomatization is possible at the
expense of moving to a more expressive language (see the
remark below Definition 5 above and also the discussion in
Section 8). Nevertheless, from a computational logic point
of view, we shall suffice with the definition of a tableau-based
decision procedure, which will be presented in Section 6.
We also observe that in order for us to capture the seman-
tics of L˜ in standard conditional logics [14] we would require
the addition of a preference relation on worlds, all standard
modalities we want to work with and a suitably defined con-
ditional for each modality in the language. Our contention
here is that this route would hardly simplify matters.
3Similarly to what happens in KLM consequence relations
(α |= β implies α |∼ β) [33] and in defeasible subsumption
relations (C  D implies C ∼ D) [9].
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From the perspective of knowledge representation and rea-
soning, it becomes important to address the question of
what it means for an L˜-sentence to be entailed from an L˜-
knowledge base.
An L˜-knowledge base is a (possibly infinite) set K ⊆ L˜.
Given a preferential Kripke model P, we extend the notion
of satisfaction to knowledge bases in the obvious way: P 
K if and only if P  α for every α ∈ K.
Definition 6. Let K ⊆ L˜ and let α ∈ L˜. We say that K
(globally) entails α in the class M of preferential Kripke
models (denoted K |= α) if and only if for every P ∈ M, if
P  K, then P  α.
Given this notion of entailment, its associated consequence
relation is defined as follows:
Cn(K) ≡def {α | K |= α} (8)
It can be checked that the consequence relation Cn(·) as
defined in (8) above is a Tarskian consequence relation:
Theorem 1. Let Cn(·) be a consequence relation defined
in terms of preferential entailment. Then Cn(·) satisfies the
following properties:
• K ⊆ Cn(K) (Inclusion)
• Cn(K) = Cn(Cn(K)) (Idempotency)
• If K1 ⊆ K2, then Cn(K1) ⊆ Cn(K2) (Monotonicity)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
That is, in spite of the defeasibility features of ∼∼, we end
up with a logic that is monotonic (at the entailment level).
5. AN APPLICATION EXAMPLE
Let us assume the following simple scenario depicting a
nuclear power-plant [8]. In a particular power station there
is an atomic pile and a cooling system, both of which can
be either on or off. A surveillance agent is in charge of
detecting hazardous situations so that the human controller
can prevent the plant from malfunctioning (Figure 2).
ON
OFF
DANGER
Figure 2: The power plant and its surveillance agent.
In what follows we shall illustrate our constructions from
previous sections in reasoning about action using the afore-
mentioned scenario.
We find in the AI literature a fair number of modal-based
formalisms for reasoning about actions and change [12, 13,
16, 18, 29, 38, 41, 42, 43]. These are essentially variants
of the modal logic K we presented in Section 2. Modal
operators are determined by a (finite) set of actions A =
{a1, . . . , an}: For each a ∈ A, there is associated a modal
operator a. Given a Kripke model, Ra ⊆ W×W is there-
fore meant to represent possible executions of an (ontic) ac-
tion a at specific worlds w ∈ W, i.e., Ra is the specification
of a’s behavior in a transition system. Hence, whenever
(w,w′) ∈ Ra, w′ is a possible outcome of doing a in w. For-
mulae of the form aα are used to specify the effects of
actions and they are read “after every execution of action a,
the formula α holds”. The operator a is mostly used to
specify the executability of actions: a reads “there is a
possible execution of action a”.
In our nuclear power plant example, let P = {p, c, h} be
a set of propositions, where p stands for “the atomic pile is
on”, c for “the cooling system is on”, and h for “hazardous
situation”. Moreover, let A = {f,m} be a set of atomic
actions, where f stands for “flipping the pile switch”, and m
for (occurrence of) “a malfunction”.
We first construct a preferential Kripke model (Defini-
tion 3) in which to check the satisfiability and truth of a
few sentences. (The purpose is to illustrate the semantics of
our notion of defeasibility in an action context rather than
to present a comprehensive modeling of the nuclear power
plant scenario.)
Let P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉 be the preferential Kripke model
depicted in Figure 3, where W = {wi | 1 ≤ i ≤ 4}, R =
〈Rf ,Rm〉, with Rf = {(w1, w2), (w2, w1), (w3, w1), (w3, w4),
(w4, w2), (w4, w4)} and Rm = {(w4, w3), (w4, w4)}, V is the
obvious valuation function, and ≺ is the transitive closure
of {(w1, w2), (w2, w3), (w3, w4)}, i.e., of the relation repre-
sented by the dashed arrows in the picture. (Note again the
direction of ≺ from less to more normal worlds.)
P :
• w1 {p, c}
• w2 {c}
• w3 {}
• w4 {p, h}
f
f
f
f
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Figure 3: Preferential Kripke model for the power
plant scenario.
The rationale of this partial order is as follows: The utility
company selling the electricity generated by the power plant
tries as far as possible to keep both the pile and the cooling
system on, ensuring that the pile can easily be switched off
(world w1); sometimes the company has to switch the pile
off for maintenance but then tries to keep the cooler running,
because turning the pile on again would not cause a fault
in the cooling system (world w2); more rarely the company
needs to switch off both the pile and the cooler, e.g. when
the latter needs maintenance (world w3); and, finally, only
in very exceptional situations would the pile be on while the
cooler is off, e.g. during a serious malfunction (world w4).
In the preferential modelP depicted above, one can check
that P  (p ∧ ¬c) ↔ h, i.e., (p ∧ ¬c) ↔ h = W. Also,
w4 ∈ h ∧ ∼∼ f¬h: at w4 we have a hazardous situation, but
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it is possible to switch the pile off having as a normal effect
a safe condition. We have that w1 satisfies ∼∼m⊥: at w1 a
malfunction cannot occur (which is not true of w4). InP we
have P  ¬p → ∼∼fp (the normal outcome of switching the
pile on is it being on), but P  ¬p → fp (see world w3).
We also haveP  c → ∼∼f¬h (if the cooler is on, the normal
result of switching the pile is a safe situation). Finally we
also have P  h → ∼∼m: in any hazardous situation a
meltdown is a distinct possibility — but fortunately P 
f¬h: from every world it is possible to return to a non-
hazardous world.
So far we have illustrated the preferential semantics of L˜-
statements using a specific preferential Kripke model. In a
knowledge representation context, though, we are interested
in preferential entailment from an L˜-theory or knowledge
base. The latter determines the preferential models that are
permissible from the standpoint of the knowledge engineer.
To illustrate this, consider the following L˜-knowledge base:
K =
{
(p ∧ ¬c) ↔ h, h → ∼∼m,
p → ∼∼f¬p, c → ∼∼fc, f¬h
}
K basically says that “a hazardous situation is one in which
the pile is on and the cooler off”, “in a hazardous situation
a malfunction is distinctly possible”, “if the pile is on, then
flipping its switch normally switches it off”, “if the cooler is
on, then switching the pile normally does not affect it” and
“it is always possible to flip the pile switch”. (Note that all
the formulae in K are true in the preferential model P of
Figure 3 above.) We can then conclude K |= p → ∼∼f¬h,
K |= ∼∼m⊥ → (¬p ∨ c) and K |= (p ∨ c) → ∼∼f¬h, using
the sound L˜-inference rules and validities presented in the
previous section.
6. TABLEAU SYSTEM
In this section we present a simple tableau calculus for
defeasible modalities based on labeled formulae and on ex-
plicit accessibility relations [22].4 As we shall see, it also
makes use of an auxiliary structure of which the intention
is to build a preference relation on possible worlds. (For a
discussion on the differences between our tableau method
and the one by Giordano et al. [20], see end of Section 8.)
Definition 7. If n ∈   and α ∈ L˜, then n :: α is a
labeled formula.
In a labeled formula n :: α, n is the label. (As we shall
see, informally, the idea is that the label stands for some
possible world in a Kripke model.)
Let mod(L˜) denote the set of all classical modalities of L˜.
(Remember our assumption that we have as many defeasible
modalities as we have classical ones and that, for a given i,
both i and ∼∼i depend on the same Ri.)
Definition 8. A skeleton is a function Σ : mod(L˜) −→
2 × .
Informally, a skeleton maps modalities in the language to
accessibility relations on possible worlds.
Definition 9. A preference relation ≺ is a binary rela-
tion on  .
4Our exposition here follows that given by Varzinczak [37]
and Castilho et al. [12, 13].
As alluded to above, ≺ is meant to capture a preference
relation on possible worlds. As we shall see below, like Σ, ≺
is built cumulatively through successive applications of the
tableau rules we shall introduce.
Definition 10. A branch is a tuple 〈S,Σ,≺〉, where S is
a set of labeled formulae, Σ is a skeleton and ≺ is a prefer-
ence relation.
Definition 11. A tableau rule is a rule of the form:
ρ
N ; Γ
D1 ; Γ′1 | . . . | Dk ; Γ′k
where N ; Γ is the numerator and D1 ; Γ′1 | . . . | Dk ; Γ′k is
the denominator.
Given a rule ρ, N represents one or more labeled formu-
lae, called the main formulae of the rule, separated by ‘,’. Γ
stands for any additional condition (on Σ or ≺) that must
be satisfied for the rule to be applicable. In the denomina-
tor, each Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, has one or more labeled formulae,
whereas each Γ′i is a condition to be satisfied after the ap-
plication of the rule (e.g. changes in the skeleton Σ or in
the relation ≺). The symbol ‘|’ indicates the occurrence of
a split in the branch.
Figure 4 presents the set of tableau rules for L˜. In the rules
we abbreviate (n, n′) ∈ Σ(i) as n i→ n′, and n′ ∈ Σ(i)(n) as
n′ ∈ Σi(n). Finally, with n′, n′′, . . . we denote labels that
have not been used before. We say that a rule ρ is applicable
to a branch 〈S,Σ,≺〉 if and only if S contains an instance of
the main formulae of ρ and the conditions Γ of ρ are satisfied
by Σ and ≺.
(⊥) n :: α, n :: ¬α
n :: ⊥ (¬)
n :: ¬¬α
n :: α
(∧) n :: α ∧ β
n :: α, n :: β
(∨) n :: ¬(α ∧ β)
n :: ¬α | n :: ¬β
(i)
n :: iα ; n
i→ n′
n′ :: α
(i)
n :: ¬iα
n′ :: ¬α ; Γ′1 | n′ :: ¬α ; Γ′2
where Γ′1 = {n i→ n′, n′ ∈ min≺ Σi(n)} and
Γ′2 = {n i→ n′, n i→ n′′, n′′ ≺ n′, n′′ ∈ min≺ Σi(n)}
(∼∼i)
n :: ∼∼iα ; n i→ n′, n′ ∈ min≺ Σi(n)
n′ :: α
( ∼∼ i)
n :: ¬∼∼iα
n′ :: ¬α ; n i→ n′, n′ ∈ min≺ Σi(n)
Figure 4: Tableau rules for L˜.
The Boolean rules together with (i) are as usual and
need no explanation. Rule (∼∼i) propagates formulae in the
scope of a defeasible necessity operator to the most preferred
(with respect to ≺) of all accessible nodes. Rule ( ∼∼ i) creates
a preferred accessible node with the corresponding labeled
formulae as content. Rule (i) replaces the standard rule
for -formulae and requires a more thorough explanation.
When creating a new accessible node, there are two possi-
bilities: Either (i) it is minimal (with respect to ≺) amongst
all the accessible nodes, in which case the result is the same
as that of applying Rule ( ∼∼ i), or (ii) it is not minimal, in
which case there must be a most preferred accessible node
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that is more preferred (with respect to ≺) than the newly
created one. (This splitting is of the same nature as that in
the (∨)-rule, i.e., it fits the purpose of a proof by cases.)
Definition 12. A tableau T for α ∈ L˜ is the limit of a
sequence T 0, . . ., T n, . . . of sets of branches where the initial
T 0 = {〈{0 :: α}, ∅, ∅〉} and every T i+1 is obtained from T i
by the application of one of the rules in Figure 4 to some
branch 〈S,Σ,≺〉 ∈ T i. Such a limit is denoted T ∞.
We make the so-called fairness assumption: Any rule that
can be applied will eventually be applied, i.e., the order of
rule applications is not relevant. We say a tableau is satu-
rated if no rule is applicable to any of its branches.
Definition 13. A branch 〈S,Σ,≺〉 is closed if and only
if n :: ⊥ ∈ S for some n. A saturated tableau T for α ∈ L˜
is closed if and only if all its branches are closed. (If T is
not closed, then we say that it is an open tableau.)
For an example of construction of a tableau, consider the
sentence α = ∼∼(p → q) → (p → q) (which is not valid).
Figure 5 depicts the (open) tableau for ¬α = ∼∼¬(p ∧ ¬q) ∧
p ∧ ¬q.
0 :: ∼∼¬(p ∧ ¬q) ∧ p ∧ ¬q
0 :: ∼∼¬(p ∧ ¬q), 0 :: p, 0 :: ¬q
1 :: ¬q ; Γ′1
1 :: p
1 :: ¬(p ∧ ¬q)
1 :: ¬p
1 :: ⊥
(⊥)
(∨)
1 :: ¬¬q
1 :: q
1 :: ⊥
(⊥)
(¬)
(∨)
(∼∼)
()
()
2 :: ¬q ; Γ′2
2 :: p
3 :: p
3 :: ¬(p ∧ ¬q)
3 :: ¬p
3 :: ⊥
(⊥)
(∨)
3 :: ¬¬q
3 :: q
(¬)
(∨)
(∼∼)
()
()
()
(∧)
Γ′1 = add (0, 1) to Σ and 1 to min≺ Σ(0)
Γ′2 = add (0, 2) and (0, 3) to Σ, (3, 2) to ≺ and 3 to min≺ Σ(0)
Figure 5: Visualization of an open tableau for the
formula ∼∼¬(p ∧ ¬q) ∧ p ∧ ¬q.
From the open tableau in Figure 5 we extract the prefer-
ential Kripke model P depicted in Figure 6. (In Figure 6
the understanding is that 3 ≺ 2 and that 0 is incomparable
with respect to ≺ to the other possible worlds.)
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. The tableau calculus for L˜ is sound and com-
plete with respect to the modal preferential semantics.
P :
•3 {p, q}
•2 {p}
• 0 {}
Figure 6: Preferential Kripke model P constructed
from Figure 5.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
It can easily be checked that in the construction of the
tableau there is only a finite number of distinct states since
every formula generated by the application of a rule is a
sub-formula of the original one. Hence we have a decision
procedure for L˜.
We end this section with a brief remark on complexity. It
is well-known that satisfiability checking for modal logic K
and Kn are both pspace-complete [23, 34]. The addition of
∼∼ and ∼∼ to the language does not affect the space complex-
ity of the resulting tableaux. If the formula at the root of
the tableau is α, and |α| = m, then the space requirement
for each label is at most O(m). Since there exists a satu-
rated tableau with depth at most O(m2), the total space
requirement is O(m3).
7. ADDING DEFEASIBLE ARGUMENTS
An obvious next step to the work presented here is the
integration of L˜ with a KLM-style defeasible consequence
relation |∼, since this would allow for the expression of both
defeasible modalities and defeasible argument forms.5 First
we need some definitions.
Given P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉 and α, β ∈ L, the defeasible
statement α |∼ β holds in P (denoted P  α |∼ β) if and
only if min≺α ⊆ β, i.e., every ≺-minimal α-world is a
β-world. As an example, in the model P of Figure 1, we
have P  p |∼ q (but note that P  p → q). We also
have P  ¬p |∼ (¬p ∧ q) and P  ¬q |∼ ¬q (from the
latter follows P  ¬q → ¬q).
It is worth noting that if only a classical modal language is
assumed, then defeasible statements here still have the same
intuition as mentioned in the Introduction. To witness, the
statement α |∼ β just says that “all normal worlds with
an α-successor have only β-successors”. That is, any |∼-
statement still refers only to normality in the premise, or,
in this case, of the ‘actual’ world. In our enriched language
we shall be able to make statements of the form α |∼ ∼∼β.
We say that a preferential Kripke model P satisfies a set
of defeasible statements if each such statement holds in P.
Given a set X of defeasible statements, we say that X (pref-
erentially) entails the defeasible statement α |∼ β (denoted
X |= α |∼ β) if every preferential model satisfying all the
statements in X also satisfies α |∼ β. (It is easy to see
that |= here is exactly the same entailment relation from
Definition 6, just restated in terms of |∼-statements.)
We can now relate the truth of L˜-sentences in a preferen-
tial model with that of defeasible statements, as the follow-
ing result shows.
5Here, |∼ need not be a new connective in the language but
can rather have the same status as, e.g., subsumption and
defeasible versions thereof in description logics [1, 7, 9].
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Lemma 2. Let α ∈ L˜ and P be a preferential Kripke
model. Then P  α if and only if P  ¬α |∼ ⊥.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
This result raises the obvious question on whether and
how entailment of L˜-sentences relates to that of |∼-statements.
Definition 14. Let K ⊆ L˜. K|∼ := {¬α |∼ ⊥ | α ∈ K}.
Theorem 3. K |= α if and only if K|∼ |= ¬α |∼ ⊥.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Hence, preferential entailment in L˜ reduces to preferen-
tial entailment of |∼-statements in the language of L˜. Note
that soundness of KLM postulates for modal preferential
reasoning [8, 10] is preserved when moving from L to L˜.
An immediate consequence of this is that the existence of a
sound and complete KLM-style |∼-based proof system [33]
for L˜ would define a decision procedure for the extension
of L˜ with |∼. At present we can only conjecture that a proof
system along these lines exists, and is based on the integra-
tion of the tableau-based proof procedure for L˜ presented in
Section 6 and the tableau calculi of Giordano et al [20].
8. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to formal-
ize a notion of relative normality in the context of defeasible
reasoning was that of Delgrande [17] in which a conditional
logic of normality is defined. Given the relationship between
the general constructions on which we base our work and
those by Kraus et al., most of the remarks in the compar-
ison made by Lehmann and Magidor [35, Section 3.7] are
applicable in comparing Delgrande’s approach to ours and
we do not repeat them here. We note though that, like
Kraus et al. and Boutilier, Delgrande focuses on defeasibil-
ity of argument forms rather than modes of reasoning as
we studied here. Contrary to them, Delgrande adopts the
semantics of standard conditional logics [14, Chapter 10],
which is based on a (general) selection function picking out
the most normal worlds relative to the current one. In his
setting, a conditional α ⇒ β holds at a world w if and only
if the set of most normal α-worlds (relative to w) are also
β-worlds. We can capture Delgrande’s conditionals in our
approach with ∼∼-formulae of the form ∼∼(α → β) in the class
of S5 preferential Kripke models.
Boutilier’s expressive conditional logics of normality [5]
act as unifying framework for a number of conditional logics,
including those of Delgrande and Kraus et al. but do not
suffice to define ∼∼. This is because his modalities are defined
directly from a preference order, and do not influence the
meaning of any further modalities added to the language.
Baltag and Smets [2] also employ preference orders to re-
fer to the normality of accessible worlds, but their aims and
resulting semantics differ from ours in key aspects. They
define multi-agent epistemic and doxastic plausibility models
similar to our preferential Kripke models. Each accessibility
relation is induced by a corresponding preference order and
linked to an agent whose beliefs are determined by what the
agent deems epistemically possible. Minimality, or doxas-
tic appearance, is therefore determined relative to an epis-
temic context, which is induced as an equivalence relation
on worlds. This results in modalities of knowledge, (condi-
tional) belief and safe belief that are somewhat related to
our defeasible modalities.
In contrast, our work offers a preferential semantic frame-
work independent of a specific application area. We assume
(for now) a single preference order across worlds in each
Kripke model. The preference order informs the meaning
of existing modalities by considering minimality in accessi-
ble worlds, where accessibility is determined independently
from the preference order. The key difference between our
proposal and plausibility models is therefore that our classi-
cal modalities are defined independently from any preference
order. The special case of a single modality which does cor-
respond to a (connected) preference order yields a logic in
which ∼∼ defines a belief operator. This follows from the con-
flation of accessibility and preference in plausibility models.
As we have seen, Britz et al. [8, 10] also propose a gen-
eral semantic framework for preferential modal logics, but
they focus on defeasible arguments rather than on defea-
sible modalities. As such, the semantics introduced there
provides a foundation for the semantics of defeasible modal-
ities, but the syntax of preferential modal logic also does not
suffice to define preferential modalities such as ours.
Booth et al. [4] introduce an operator with which one can
refer directly in the language to those most typical situa-
tions in which a given sentence is true. For instance, in
their enriched language, a sentence of the form α refers to
the ‘most typical’ α-worlds in a semantics similar to ours.
One of the advantages of such an extension is the possibility
to make statements of the kind“all normal α-worlds are nor-
mal β-worlds”, thereby shifting the focus of normality from
the antecedent by also allowing us to talk about normal-
ity in the consequent. This additional expressivity can also
be obtained by the addition of the modality  of Modular
Go¨del-Lo¨b logic to express normality syntactically [6, 20]:
α ≡def ¬α ∧ α (9)
Despite the gain in expressivity, both these proposals re-
main propositional in nature in that the only modality al-
lowed is the one with semantics determined by the prefer-
ence order. Britz et al. extended propositional preferential
reasoning to the modal case [8, 10], but the modalities un-
der consideration there remain classical — their meaning re-
mains as in propositional modal logic, despite the underlying
preferential semantics of the logic due to the extension of the
language with conditional statements of the form α |∼ β.
If we internalize the preference relation as a modality and
enrich our classical modal language with converse modalities
and nominals [3], then ∼∼ can be given an entirely classical
treatment as follows:
∼∼α ≡def
∨
o∈O
(o ∧ (¬α → ≺(α ∧ ˘o))) (10)
where ≺ is the dual of the modality characterizing the
preference relation [6], ˘ is the converse of  and O is a set
of nominals. Then ∼∼α is true at a world w in a (hybrid)
Kripke model if and only if w is the denotation of some
nominal o ∈ O and every ¬α-world that is accessible from w
is less normal than some α-world which is accessible from w.
(Of course, besides ensuring that each nominal is interpreted
as at most one possible world one also has to make sure that
each possible world in a Kripke model is the denotation of
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some nominal o ∈ O. This is warranted in the class of named
models [3, pp. 439–447].)
The definition in (10) above has the inconvenience of re-
quiring infinitary disjunctions [30] in the language. We can
replace (10) with an infinitely denumerable collection of ax-
iom schemata given by:
(F) @o∼∼α ↔ @o(≺¬˘o → α) (11)
As mentioned earlier, making use of such a machinery takes
us to a much more expressive language. Note though that
complexity-wise we remain in the same class — satisfiability
in the basic hybrid logic like the one briefly sketched above
is pspace-complete [3, Theorem 7.21].
Finally, despite the similarities between the tableau method
we presented here and the one by Giordano et al. [20], they
remain largely superficial. First, our preferential semantics
counts as a proper generalization of the KLM approach to
full modal logic, whereas theirs is an embedding of proposi-
tional KLM consequence relations in an enriched language.
Second, again, in their approach the preference relation is
explicit and cast as an additional modality, requiring a spe-
cial tableau rule to deal with it. Here the preference relation
is not present in the language and materializes only in the
inner workings of our tableau method.
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The main contribution of the present paper is the pro-
vision of a natural, simple and intuitive framework within
which to represent defeasible modes of inference. The de-
feasible modalities we introduced here refer to the relative
normality of accessible worlds, unlike syntactic characteri-
zations of normality [4, 5, 20, 21], which refer to the rela-
tive normality of worlds in which a given sentence is true,
or |∼ [33, 35], which refers to the relative normality of the
worlds in which the premise is true.
We have seen that the modal logics obtained through the
addition of ∼∼i are monotonic (Theorem 1). Although a logic
based on L˜ can be extended to include a nonmonotonic con-
ditional |∼, such an extension does not make the addition
of ∼∼i a superfluous extension to the language, since ∼∼i can-
not be expressed in terms of |∼. One avenue for future
research is therefore integrating ∼∼i with our approach to
modal preferential reasoning [8, 10], since this would allow
for the expression of both defeasible arguments and defeasi-
ble modalities. First steps towards this aim were presented
in Section 7. Once this is in place, a deeper exploration of
applications in various modal logics is warranted.
Here we have investigated the case where a single prefer-
ence ordering among worlds is assumed. As we have seen,
this fits the bill in capturing defeasibility of action effects or
obligations, where an ‘objective’ or commonly agreed upon
notion of normality can be quite easily justified. When mov-
ing to defeasible notions of knowledge or belief, though, a
multi-preference based approach seems to be more appropri-
ate, as agents may have different views on which worlds are
more normal than others, i.e., preferences become subjective
or at least relative to an agent [2].
Here we have investigated defeasible modalities in the sys-
tem K. Our basic framework paves the way for exploring
similar notions of defeasibility and additional properties in
specific systems of modal logics. Once this is in place we
will be able to investigate further applications of defeasi-
ble modalities in e.g. dynamic epistemic logic [36] as well
as in other similarly structured logics, such as description
logics [1]. We are currently investigating such extensions.
Finally, from a knowledge representation perspective, when
one deals with knowledge bases, issues related to modu-
larization [25, 26, 27, 28], knowledge base update and re-
pair [24, 39, 40] as well as knowledge base maintenance and
versioning [19] show up. These are tasks acknowledged as
important by the community in the classical case [31] and
that also make sense in a nonmonotonic setting. When mov-
ing to a defeasible approach, though, such tasks have to be
reassessed and specific methods and techniques redesigned.
This constitutes an avenue worthy of exploration.
10. REFERENCES
[1] F. Baader, D. Calvanese, D. McGuinness, D. Nardi,
and P. Patel-Schneider, editors. The Description Logic
Handbook: Theory, Implementation and Applications.
Cambridge University Press, 2 edition, 2007.
[2] A. Baltag and S. Smets. A qualitative theory of
dynamic interactive belief revision. In G. Bonanno,
W. van der Hoek, and M. Wooldridge, editors, Logic
and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory
(LOFT7), pages 13–60. Amsterdam Univ. Press, 2008.
[3] P. Blackburn, M. de Rijke, and Y. Venema. Modal
Logic. Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer
Science. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
[4] R. Booth, T. Meyer, and I. Varzinczak. PTL: A
propositional typicality logic. In L. Farin˜as del Cerro,
A. Herzig, and J. Mengin, editors, Proceedings of the
13th European Conference on Logics in Artificial
Intelligence (JELIA), number 7519 in LNCS, pages
107–119. Springer, 2012.
[5] C. Boutilier. Conditional logics of normality: A modal
approach. Artificial Intelligence, 68(1):87–154, 1994.
[6] K. Britz, J. Heidema, and W. Labuschagne. Semantics
for dual preferential entailment. Journal of
Philosophical Logic, 38:433–446, 2009.
[7] K. Britz, J. Heidema, and T. Meyer. Semantic
preferential subsumption. In J. Lang and G. Brewka,
editors, Proc. International Conference on Principles
of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR),
pages 476–484. AAAI Press/MIT Press, 2008.
[8] K. Britz, T. Meyer, and I. Varzinczak. Preferential
reasoning for modal logics. Electronic Notes in
Theoretical Computer Science, 278:55–69, 2011.
[9] K. Britz, T. Meyer, and I. Varzinczak. Semantic
foundation for preferential description logics. In
D. Wang and M. Reynolds, editors, Proc. Australasian
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, number
7106 in LNAI, pages 491–500. Springer, 2011.
[10] K. Britz, T. Meyer, and I. Varzinczak. Normal modal
preferential consequence. In M. Thielscher and
D. Zhang, editors, Proc. Australasian Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, number 7691 in
LNAI, pages 505–516. Springer, 2012.
[11] K. Britz and I. Varzinczak. Defeasible modes of
inference: A preferential perspective. In International
Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning (NMR), 2012.
[12] M. Castilho, O. Gasquet, and A. Herzig. Formalizing
action and change in modal logic I: the frame problem.
Journal of Logic and Computation, 9(5):701–735, 1999.
57
[13] M. Castilho, A. Herzig, and I. Varzinczak. It depends
on the context! A decidable logic of actions and plans
based on a ternary dependence relation. In Intl.
Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning (NMR), 2002.
[14] B. Chellas. Modal logic: An introduction. Cambridge
University Press, 1980.
[15] G. Crocco and P. Lamarre. On the connections
between nonmonotonic inference systems and
conditional logics. In R. Nebel, C. Rich, and
W. Swartout, editors, Proc. International Conference
on Principles of Knowledge Representation and
Reasoning (KR), pages 565–571. Morgan Kaufmann
Publishers, 1992.
[16] G. De Giacomo and M. Lenzerini. PDL-based
framework for reasoning about actions. In M. Gori
and G. Soda, editors, Proceedings of the 4th Congress
of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence
(IA*AI), number 992 in LNAI, pages 103–114.
Springer-Verlag, 1995.
[17] J. Delgrande. A first-order logic for prototypical
properties. Artificial Intelligence, 33:105–130, 1987.
[18] R. Demolombe, A. Herzig, and I. Varzinczak.
Regression in modal logic. Journal of Applied
Non-Classical Logics, 13(2):165–185, 2003.
[19] E. Franconi, T. Meyer, and I. Varzinczak. Semantic
diff as the basis for knowledge base versioning. In
International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning
(NMR), 2010.
[20] L. Giordano, V. Gliozzi, N. Olivetti, and G. Pozzato.
Analytic tableaux calculi for KLM logics of
nonmonotonic reasoning. ACM Transactions on
Computational Logic, 10(3):18:1–18:47, 2009.
[21] L. Giordano, N. Olivetti, V. Gliozzi, and G. Pozzato.
ALC + T : a preferential extension of description
logics. Fundamenta Informaticae, 96(3):341–372, 2009.
[22] R. Gore´. Tableau methods for modal and temporal
logics. In M. D’Agostino, D. Gabbay, R. Ha¨hnle, and
J. Posegga, editors, Handbook of Tableau Methods,
pages 297–396. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.
[23] J. Halpern and Y. Moses. A guide to completeness
and complexity for modal logics of knowledge and
belief. Artificial Intelligence, 54:319–379, 1992.
[24] A. Herzig, L. Perrussel, and I. Varzinczak. Elaborating
domain descriptions. In G. Brewka, S. Coradeschi,
A. Perini, and P. Traverso, editors, Proceedings of the
17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(ECAI), pages 397–401. IOS Press, 2006.
[25] A. Herzig and I. Varzinczak. Domain descriptions
should be modular. In R. Lo´pez de Ma´ntaras and
L. Saitta, editors, Proceedings of the 16th European
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI), pages
348–352. IOS Press, 2004.
[26] A. Herzig and I. Varzinczak. Cohesion, coupling and
the meta-theory of actions. In L. Kaelbling and
A. Saffiotti, editors, Proc. International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages
442–447. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 2005.
[27] A. Herzig and I. Varzinczak. On the modularity of
theories. In R. Schmidt, I. Pratt-Hartmann,
M. Reynolds, and H. Wansing, editors, Advances in
Modal Logic, 5, pages 93–109. King’s College
Publications, 2005.
[28] A. Herzig and I. Varzinczak. A modularity approach
for a fragment of ALC. In M. Fisher, W. van der
Hoek, B. Konev, and A. Lisitsa, editors, Proceedings
of the 10th European Conference on Logics in
Artificial Intelligence (JELIA), number 4160 in LNAI,
pages 216–228. Springer-Verlag, 2006.
[29] A. Herzig and I. Varzinczak. Metatheory of actions:
beyond consistency. Artificial Intelligence,
171:951–984, 2007.
[30] C. Karp. Languages with Expressions of Infinite
Length. North-Holland, 1964.
[31] B. Konev, D. Walther, and F. Wolter. The logical
difference problem for description logic terminologies.
In A. Armando, P. Baumgartner, and G. Dowek,
editors, Proc. International Joint Conference on
Automated Reasoning (IJCAR), number 5195 in
LNAI, pages 259–274. Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[32] M. Kracht and F. Wolter. Properties of independently
axiomatizable bimodal logics. Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 56(4):1469–1485, 1991.
[33] S. Kraus, D. Lehmann, and M. Magidor.
Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and
cumulative logics. Artificial Intelligence, 44:167–207,
1990.
[34] R. Ladner. The computational complexity of
provability in systems of modal propositional logic.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 6(3):467–480, 1977.
[35] D. Lehmann and M. Magidor. What does a
conditional knowledge base entail? Artificial
Intelligence, 55:1–60, 1992.
[36] H. van Ditmarsch, W. van der Hoek, and B. Kooi.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Springer, 2007.
[37] I. Varzinczak. Causalidade e dependeˆncia em
racioc´ınio sobre ac¸o˜es (“Causality and dependency in
reasoning about actions”). M.Sc. thesis, Universidade
Federal do Parana´, Curitiba, Brazil, 2002.
[38] I. Varzinczak. What is a good domain description?
Evaluating and revising action theories in dynamic
logic. PhD thesis, Univ. Paul Sabatier, Toulouse, 2006.
[39] I. Varzinczak. Action theory contraction and minimal
change. In J. Lang and G. Brewka, editors, Proc.
International Conference on Principles of Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning (KR), pages 651–661.
AAAI Press/MIT Press, 2008.
[40] I. Varzinczak. On action theory change. Journal of
Artificial Intelligence Research, 37:189–246, 2010.
[41] D. Zhang and N. Foo. EPDL: A logic for causal
reasoning. In B. Nebel, editor, Proc. International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI),
pages 131–138. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 2001.
[42] D. Zhang and N. Foo. Interpolation properties of
action logic: Lazy-formalization to the frame problem.
In S. Flesca, S. Greco, N. Leone, and G. G. Ianni,
editors, Proceedings of the 8th European Conference
on Logics in Artificial Intelligence (JELIA), number
2424 in LNCS, pages 357–368. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[43] D. Zhang and N. Foo. Frame problem in dynamic
logic. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics,
15(2):215–239, 2005.
58
APPENDIX
A. PROOFS OF MAIN RESULTS
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
• Proving the ‘only if’ part: Let α ∈ L be such thatM  α,
where M = 〈W,R,V〉. Then M , w  α for every w ∈ W.
Let P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉 for some ≺ ⊆ W × W. Since α ∈
L, α’s truth conditions do not depend on ≺. Then, given
that α is true at every w ∈ W, it follows that α = W and
therefore P  α.
• Proving the ‘if’ part: Let α ∈ L be such thatP  α, where
P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉. Then α = W. Since α ∈ L, it follows
that M , w  α for every w ∈ W with M = 〈W,R,V〉.
Hence M  α.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
• Showing Inclusion: Let α ∈ K. Since every preferential
Kripke model of K is a model of α, it immediately follows
that K |= α, from which follows α ∈ Cn(K).
• Showing Idempotency: Let α ∈ Cn(K). Then Cn(K) |=
α follows by the same argument given for Inclusion above.
Hence α ∈ Cn(Cn(K)). For the other direction, let α ∈
Cn(Cn(K)). Then Cn(K) |= α. Assume that α /∈ Cn(K).
Then K |= α, and then there exists P such that P  K
but P  α. But from the definition of Cn(·) we have P 
Cn(K), from which we derive a contradiction. Hence α ∈
Cn(K).
• Showing Monotonicity: Let α ∈ Cn(K1). Then K1 |= α.
Let P be such that P  K2. Since K1 ⊆ K2, we have
P  K1 too. Hence P  α and we have K2 |= α, and
therefore α ∈ Cn(K2).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We first show completeness of our tableau method, i.e., if
α ∈ L˜ is preferentially valid, then every tableau for ¬α is
closed. Equivalently, if there is an open (saturated) tableau
for α, then α is satisfiable, i.e., there exists a preferential
Kripke model P in which α = ∅.
In the following, we show that from any open tableau T
for α ∈ L˜ one can construct a preferential Kripke model
satisfying α, from which the result follows.
Let T = T ∞ be an open saturated tableau for the for-
mula α ∈ L˜ (possibly infinite). Then there must be an
open branch 〈S,Σ,≺〉 in T (cf. Definition 13). Let the tuple
PT := 〈WT ,RT ,VT ,≺T 〉 be defined as follows:
• WT := {n | n :: β ∈ S};
• RT := 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉, where each Ri := Σ(i), for 1 ≤
i ≤ n;
• VT := v, where v : WT × P −→ {0, 1} and v(n, p) = 1
if and only if n :: p ∈ S, and
• ≺T :=≺.
Lemma 3. P is a preferential Kripke model.
Proof. That MT := 〈WT ,RT ,VT 〉 is a Kripke model
follows immediately from the definition of WT , RT and VT
above. It remains to show that ≺T is a strict partial order
satisfying the smoothness condition [33]. That is, one has
to show that:
• ≺T is irreflexive and transitive: This follows from the
construction of ≺ in Rules ( ∼∼ i) and (i), since (i) no
pair (n, n) is ever added to ≺ and (ii) no chain of length
greater than 2 is ever added to the preference structure.
• ≺T has no infinitely descending chains: Clearly no pair
(n, n′) is added to ≺ beyond those added by Rules ( ∼∼ i)
and (i). Given this one can easily check that ≺ must
have a minimum.
It remains to show that P above satisfies α.
Lemma 4. Let P = 〈WT ,RT ,VT ,≺T 〉 and let β be a
sub-formula of α. If n :: β ∈ S, then n ∈ β.
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on the num-
ber of connectives in β.
Base case: β is a literal. We have two cases: (i) β = p ∈ P.
Then n :: p ∈ S if and only if v(n, p) = 1 if and only if
VT (n, p) = 1 if and only if n ∈ p = β. (ii) β = ¬p for
some p ∈ P. Then n :: ¬p ∈ S, and therefore n :: p /∈ S,
otherwise n :: ⊥ ∈ S (as T is saturated), contradicting the
assumption that 〈S,Σ,≺〉 is open. Hence v(n, p) = 0, and
then n /∈ p, from which follows n ∈ WT \p = ¬p = β.
Induction step: The Boolean cases are as usual. We analyze
the modal cases (below MT = 〈WT ,RT ,VT 〉):
• β = iγ: If n :: iγ ∈ S, then n′ :: γ ∈ S by Rule (i),
for every n′ such that (n, n′) ∈ Ri. By the induction
hypothesis, n′ ∈ γ for every n′ such that (n, n′) ∈ Ri,
i.e., MT , n′  γ for every n′ such that (n, n′) ∈ Ri.
From this we conclude MT , n  iγ and therefore n ∈
iγ.
• β = ¬iγ: If n :: ¬iγ ∈ S, then by Rule (i) there
exists n′ such that (n, n′) ∈ Ri and n′ :: ¬γ ∈ S. Then
there exists n′ such that (n, n′) ∈ Ri and n′ ∈ ¬γ, by
the induction hypothesis. Hence n ∈ ¬iγ.
• β = ∼∼iγ: If n :: ∼∼iγ ∈ S, then n′ :: γ ∈ S by Rule (∼∼i),
for every n′ such that n′ ∈ min≺T Ri(n). By the in-
duction hypothesis, n′ ∈ γ for every n′ such that
n′ ∈ min≺T Ri(n), and therefore n ∈ ∼∼iγ.
• β = ¬∼∼iγ: If n :: ¬∼∼iγ ∈ S, then by Rule ( ∼∼ i) there
exists n′ such that n′ ∈ min≺T Ri(n) and n′ :: ¬γ ∈ S.
Then there exists n′ such that n′ ∈ min≺T Ri(n) and
n′ ∈ ¬γ, by the induction hypothesis. Hence n ∈
¬∼∼iγ.
Now, since 0 :: α ∈ S, from Lemma 4 we conclude that
0 ∈ α. Hence α = ∅ for the preferential Kripke model
constructed as above, and therefore α is satisfiable, as we
wanted to show.
In the following we show soundness, i.e., if α ∈ L˜ is (pref-
erentially) satisfiable, then there is an open tableau for α.
Equivalently, if all the tableaux for α are closed, then α is
unsatisfiable, i.e., ¬α is valid.
Definition 15. Let S be a set of labeled formulae. S(n) :=
{β | n :: β ∈ S}.
Definition 16. Ŝ(n) := ∧{β | β ∈ S(n)}.
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Lemma 5. If, for every tableau rule that can be applied to
T j = {. . . , 〈Sj ,Σj ,≺j〉, . . .} to produce T j+1 = {. . . , 〈Sj+1,
Σj+1,≺j+1〉, . . .} and for every branch 〈Sj ,Σj ,≺j〉 ∈ T j
there exists n such that ̂Sj+1(n) is unsatisfiable, then Ŝj(n)
is unsatisfiable.
Proof. We suffice with the cases of Rules ( ∼∼ i) and (i).
• Rule ( ∼∼ i): If Sj contains n :: ¬∼∼iβ, then an applica-
tion of Rule ( ∼∼ i) creates a new label n′, adds n
i→ n′
to Σj(i) to obtain Σj+1(i), adds n′ :: ¬β to Sj to ob-
tain Sj+1, and sets n′ as a minimum in Σj+1(i) with
respect to ≺j+1 (which extends ≺j). Now, suppose
Ŝj(n) is satisfiable, but ̂Sj+1(n′) is unsatisfiable. Since
̂Sj+1(n′) = ¬β (as Sj+1 is the singleton {n′ :: ¬β} —
n′ the freshly added label), then ¬β must be unsatisfi-
able, i.e., |= β. From this and normal necessitation —
Rule (6) —, we have |= ∼∼iβ. Hence Ŝj(n) is unsatisfi-
able too because n :: ¬∼∼iβ ∈ Sj .
• Rule (i): If Sj contains n :: ¬iβ, then an applica-
tion of Rule (i) will create a new label n
′ and either
(i) add n
i→ n′ to Σj(i) to obtain Σj+1(i), add n′ :: ¬β
to Sj to obtain Sj+1, and set n′ as a minimum in
Σj+1(i) with respect to ≺j+1 (thereby extending ≺j) or
(ii) add n
i→ n′ to Σj(i) to obtain Σj+1(i), add n′ :: ¬β
to Sj to obtain Sj+1, create a new label n′′ and also
add n
i→ n′′ to Σj+1(i), add (n′′, n′) to ≺j to obtain
≺j+1 and set n′′ as a minimum in Σj+1(i) with respect
to ≺j+1. If (i) is the case, then we have the same argu-
ment as for Rule ( ∼∼ i) above. Let us assume (ii) is the
case. Suppose Ŝj(n) is satisfiable, but either ̂Sj+1(n′)
is unsatisfiable or ̂Sj+1(n′′) is unsatisfiable. If ̂Sj+1(n′)
is unsatisfiable, since ̂Sj+1(n′) = ¬β we have the same
argument as for Rule ( ∼∼ i) above. If ̂Sj+1(n′′) is un-
satisfiable, then since ̂Sj+1(n′′) = , we have |= ⊥,
which implies |= i⊥, and then |= iβ. Hence Ŝj(n)
is unsatisfiable too because n :: ¬iβ ∈ Sj .
From Lemma 5 we conclude that if all tableaux for α are
closed, then every Ŝ(n) is unsatisfiable. In particular Ŝ(0) =
α is unsatisfiable. Hence all rules preserve satisfiability when
transforming one set of branches into another. This warrants
soundness of our tableau rules.
A.4 Proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 3
Lemma 2: Let P = 〈W,R,V,≺〉. P  α if and only if
α = W if and only if ¬α = ∅ if and only if min≺¬α = ∅
if and only if min≺¬α ⊆ ⊥ if and only if P¬α |∼ ⊥.
Theorem 3: LetK|∼ be obtained fromK as in Definition 14.
For the ‘only if’ part, let P be such that P  K|∼, i.e.,
P  ¬β |∼ ⊥ for every ¬β |∼ ⊥ in K|∼. From Lemma 2,
this is the case if and only if P  β for every β ∈ K. Hence
P  K, and since K |= α, we have P  α too. From
Lemma 2 again we get P  ¬α |∼ ⊥. Now, for the ‘if’ part,
let P be such that P  K, i.e., P  β for all β ∈ K. From
Lemma 2, it follows that P  ¬β |∼ ⊥ for every β ∈ K,
and then P  K|∼. From this and K|∼ |= ¬α |∼ ⊥ we
have P  ¬α |∼ ⊥, and therefore by Lemma 2 again we get
P  α.
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